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COMMENTS
ATTRACTIVE NUISANCE-LIABILITY OF THE
UNITED STATES FOR ACCIDENTAL DROWNING
OF INFANT TRESPASSERS IN MIDDLE RIO
GRANDE PROJECT IRRIGATION DITCHES
Forty-four persons have drowned in the unfenced irrigation
ditches of the Middle Rio Grande Project since September 9,
1959.1 Twenty-two of the victims were infants between one year
and seven years of age. The refusal of the United States Bureau
of Reclamation to admit any liability for these drownings or to
fence, cover, or in any way protect infants of a tender age from
the hazards of drowning in the ditches has created a dilemma for
the residents of the Middle Rio Grande Conservancy District.2
Perhaps the only way for the residents to require the Bureau
of Reclamation or the Middle Rio Grande Conservancy District
to take reasonable steps to protect infants from the obvious dan-
gers of this public irrigation system, would be to convince the courts
that these agencies should be held liable for these drownings.3
This is probably the only solution remaining due to the fact that
the Board of Directors of the Middle Rio Grande Conservancy
District is appointed by the Conservancy Court for six year terms. 4
Therefore, there is virtually no opportunity to enforce the will of
the community through the election process. Further, the Depart-
ment of the Interior has been consistently unwilling to expend
funds to implement protective measures. We are confronted with
a serious conflict between the social and economic needs of the com-
munity for a public irrigation system and the patently unacceptable
1. Dep't of Interior, Bureau of Reclamation, Middle Rio Grande Project Water
Safety Study 3 (1969). This is an unpublished report of the office of the Chief Engi-
neer, Middle Rio Grande Project, Albuquerque. Three persons who drowned in the
summer and fall of 1969 were added to the total in the report for purposes of this
article.
- 2. These ditches belong to the Middle Rio Grande Conservancy District, N.M.
Stat. Ann. §§ 75-28-1 to -67 (Repl. 1968), but the United States, acting through the
Department of the Interior, Bureau of Reclamation, has contracted to operate and
maintain them.
3. There is a general reimbursement clause in the operation and maintenance con-
tract between the Bureau of Reclamation and the Middle Rio Grande Conservancy
District, para. 13 at 6-8. This clause would appear to provide for reimbursement of
the Bureau by the District for financial losses incurred through tort liability.
4. N.M. Stat. Ann §§ 75-28-1 to -67 (Repl. 1968).
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waste of young lives through drownings in the ditches of that
system.
Most jurisdictions have adopted a special rule of tort liability
which distinguishes trespassing children from trespassing adults
on the basis of the inability of the child to protect himself against
the peril which he encounters. This theory is usually referred to by
the misnomer of the "attractive nuisance" doctrine." Since the infant
is usually a trespasser on the premises, some such theory is neces-
sary to make a landowner liable at all.' Recovery for the drowning
of an infant is usually sought under this doctrine. The most widely
accepted formulation of the attractive nuisance doctrine is con-
tained in the Restatement of the Law of Torts (Second Edition)
§ 339. The tendency in jurisdictions which apply the doctrine under
other circumstances, is to refuse, as a matter of law, to apply it to
permit recovery for the drowning of a child unless the drowning
resulted from some hidden inherent danger in addition to the water
itself.' Such cases usually rely on the presumption that in the absence
of any latent or hidden element of danger, bodies of water ordi-
narily represent dangers which should be obvious to children old
enough to be allowed at large. Therefore, such perils do not con-
stitute an attractive nuisance or an unreasonable risk of death or
serious bodily harm. The landowner is under no obligation to fence
or otherwise guard such places, and he will not be liable for in-
juries or death resulting from dangers which should have been
known and appreciated by the child."
The numerous cases which have limited attractive nuisance
liability by setting up certain categories of conditions in which tres-
passing children were presumed, as a matter of law, to be capable
of fully understanding have been soundly criticized by Dean Prosser:
5. Keffe v. Milwaukee & Saint P.R.R., 21 Minn. 207 (1875). See note 13 infra.
6. Annot., 8 A.L.R.2d 1254 (1949), a comprehensive annotation on "Child's Drown-
ing-Landowner's Liability."
The landowner owes the adult only the duty not to wilfully or wantonly injure him
and to warn him only of dangers known by the landowner to exist after he has
knowledge of the trespasser's presence on the land. James, Tort Liability to Occupiers
of Land: Duties O'wed Trespassers, 63 Yale L.J. 144,145 (1953).
7. Annot., 8 A.L.R.2d 1259 (1949).
8. See Foster v. United States, 183 F. Supp. 524 (D.N.M. 1959), aff'd mem., 280
F.2d 431 (10th Cir. 1960) ; Avina v. United States, 115 F. Supp. 579 (W.D. Tex.
1953) ; Salladay v. Old Dominion Copper Min. Co., 12 Ariz. 124, 100 P. 441 (1909)
Cardenas v. Turlock Irrigation Dist.,-Cal. App.-, 73 Cal. Rptr. 69 (Ct. App. 1968)
Staley v. Security Athletic Ass'n, 152 Colo. 19, 380 P.2d 53 (1963) ; Phipps v. Mize,
116 Colo. 288, 180 P.2d 233 (1947); Mellas v. Lowdermilk, 58 N.M. 363, 271 P.2d
399 (1954) ; Brinkerhoff v. Salt Lake City, 13 Utah 2d 214, 371 P.2d 211 (1962). For
comprehensive annotations on this point see 16 A.L.R.3d 90 (1967) ; 8 A.L.R.2d 1254
(1949) ; 36 A.L.R. 34 (1925) ; and 38 Am. Jur. Negligence § 151 (1941).
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The soundness of such arbitrary rules as to what children may
always be expected to comprehend may be open to question. The
impressive number of cases of dead children, attesting their failure
to appreciate the risks, is sufficient in itself to cast some doubt upon
the validity of the assumption.9
In the same article, Prosser points out two groups of cases in which
the fixed rules have broken down. The first group is where the land-
owner knows that children, who are so extremely young that they
cannot be expected to appreciate the danger, are likely to trespass.
Such a child is usually under six years of age. He says the absurdity
of the assumption that an infant of three or four will appreciate
the risk becomes too manifest when the infant is known to be in the
vicinity of fire or water.
The second group of cases where the arbitrary rule is useless is
where the court finds that there was some so-called enhanced risk
which was greater than that which will normally accompany such
a condition. These include cases of concealed or masked dangers,
cases of special attractions, cases of dangerous conditions on or
near a public place where children usually play, or where a land-
owner, because of his knowledge of past trespasses and the dan-
gerous condition, is made aware of an increased probability of some
injury. According to Prosser, a great many of such cases turn upon
factors which do not bear upon the child's appreciation of the
risk at all, and those cases cast additional doubt upon the validity of
any such fixed rules. He suggests that each case be considered in light
of all its particular facts.' 0
Only one case seeking recovery for the drowning of an infant in a
Middle Rio Grande Project irrigation ditch has been reported."
This Comment will analyze that decision as a point of departure for
discussing a recent line of other New Mexico attractive nuisance
cases, rendered since that decision. These decisions alter New Mex-
ico's application of that doctrine by rejecting the legal presumption
of a child's capacity to comprehend and avoid the danger of any
fixed category of conditions. 12 It seems that New Mexico has now
unshackled itself from the fiction that infants of tender ages are
capable of realizing the danger of drowning in open water hazards.
There is now a realistic probability that, given the proper factual
9. Prosser, Trespassing Children, 47 Calif. L. Rev. 458 (1959).
10. Id. at 458-61.
11. Foster v. United States, supra note 8.
12. Saul v. Roman Catholic Church, 75 N.M. 160, 402 P.2d 48 (1965) Martinez
v. Louis Lyster, Gen. Contractor, Inc., 75 N.M. 639, 409 P.2d 493 (1965) Martinez
v. C.R. Davis Contracting Co., 73 N.M. 474, 389 P.2d 597 (1964).
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situation, the attractive nuisance doctrine, as it appears in the Re-
statement of the Law of Torts (Second Edition) § 339, can be ap-
plied in wrongful death actions to obtain recovery for drownings
of infants in unprotected irrigation ditches.'
3
Josephine Foster sought recovery against the United States for
the death of her two children, aged four and seven, under provi-
sions of the Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. §§ 1346, 2671 et
seq. 4 The children had drowned in an irrigation ditch belong-
ing to the Middle Rio Grande Conservancy District which the
United States, acting through the Department of the Interior,
Bureau of Reclamation, had contracted to operate and maintain.
It was alleged that the government had maintained an attractive
nuisance, and that it had been negligent in not having guardrails
along a bridge and in not keeping fences in the proper state of re-
pair. Recovery was denied on three grounds: first, the mother had
been contributorily negligent in allowing the children to cross the
ditch without proper supervision; second, the plaintiff failed to sus-
tain her burden of proof that the deaths of the children had been
caused by the negligence of the government; and third, under New
Mexico case law, the attractive nuisance doctrine imposed no liabil-
ity on the federal government for drownings in an irrigation ditch.
The court also held that the facts did not bring the case within the
provisions of the Federal Tort Claims Act," exempting the govern-
ment from liability where discretion of officials or employees is in-
volved.' 6 This decision of the United States District Court for
New Mexico was affirmed in a memorandum opinion by the Tenth
Circuit Court of Appeals. 7
13. The discussion of New Mexico case law in this Comment assumes that New
Mexico has generally accepted the attractive nuisance doctrine as set out in Restate-
ment (Second) of Torts § 339 (1965) ; see cases cited note 12 supra; McFall v.
Shelley, 70 N.M. 390, 374 P.2d 141 (1962) ; Klaus v. Eden, 70 N.M. 371, 374 P.2d 129
(1962) ; Mellas v. Lowdermilk, supra note 8; Selby v. Tolbert, 56 N.M. 718, 249 P.2d
498 (1952) ; Barker v. City of Santa Fe, 47 N.M. 85, 136 P.2d 480 (1943).
New Mexico does not limit application of the doctrine to cases of landowner li-
ability but applies it equally to dangerous items of personal property whether on
public or private property. There is no requirement that a child actually have been
attracted to the premises itself. McFall v. Shelley, supra at 392, 374 P.2d at 143. New
Mexico recognizes that attractive nuisance liability is basically liability for negligence:
. . . we see nothing different in the so-called law of attractive nuisance and
the general law of negligence, except that involved is a recognition of the
habits and characteristics of very young children. Klaus v. Eden at 375.
This position is recognized by the addition of a sub-section (e) to Restatement (Second)
of Torts § 339 (1965) : the possessor fails to exercise reasonable care to eliminate the
danger or otherwise to protect the children. See also 3 Natural Resources J. 193 (1963).
14. Foster v. United States, supra note 8, at 525.
15. Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2860(a) (1965).
16. Foster v. United States, supra note 8, at 528.
17. Foster v. United States, 280 F.2d 431 (10th Cir. 1960).
[VOL. 10
After the Foster decision, the Federal Tort Claims Act was
amended to provide:
(A) An action shall not be instituted upon a claim against the
United States which has been presented to a federal agency, . . .
unless such federal agency has made final disposition of the claim.""
Therefore, now a litigant must first exhaust his administrative
remedies before he can file a tort claim against the United States
in federal court, ". . in the same manner and to the same extent
as a private individual under like circumstances. . ."' New Mex-
ico case law would apply in determining the tort liability of the
United States. The court's rationale for refusing to hold the
United States liable under the attractive nuisance doctrine was ex-
plained as follows:
Liability under the attractive nuisance doctrine does not appear to
exist in cases such as the present proceeding. The New Mexico deci-
sions, in the absence of additional facts, seem to reject the attractive
nuisance theory.20
This position was supported by the following New Mexico cases:
Selby v. Tolbert, Barker v. City of Santa Fe and Mellas v. Lowder-
milk. 2 ' Relying upon the authorities and the facts adduced in the ac-
tion, the court denied plaintiff's prayer for relief.
The New Mexico supreme court allowed recovery in both Selby
v. Tolbert and Barker v. City of Santa Fe by applying the criterion
of the Restatement of the Law of Torts § 339. However, both of
these cases involved hidden dangers not apparent to the children
who were injured. The Selby child was injured after being attracted
onto a vacant lot by the melted red glass on a burned out semi-
trailer. The propped-up trailer fell over on the child. The Barker
child went onto the premises of a city sewage plant to retrieve a hat
which had blown there. The top of the sewage tank was covered
with a thick sludge which gave the appearance of being solid. She
stepped onto the sludge and was drowned in the tank.
Mellas v. Lowdermilk denied recovery for the drowning of a
nine-year-old boy on the grounds of contributory negligence. The
child had drowned while swimming, without permission, in a pond
maintained on defendants' business premises. The pond was ap-
proximately one thousand feet west of a main highway and was not
visible from the highway. The premises were fenced and "no tres-
18. Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2675(a) (1965).
19. Id. § 2674.
20. Foster v. United States, supra note 8, at 526.
21. See cases cited note 13 supra.
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passing" and "no swimming" signs were posted. Plaintiffs' allega-
tion that the pond was an attractive nuisance was rejected and the
court refused to extend the doctrine to cases of patent and visible
alluring dangers:
Ponds, pools, lakes, streams, and other waters embody perils that
are deemed to be obvious to children of tenderest years; and as a
general proposition no liability attaches to a proprietor by reason of
death resulting therefrom to children who have come upon the land
to bathe, skate, or play. 22
Although it is possible to question the wisdom of legally pre-
suming a young child's capacity to comprehend and avoid the dan-
gers of water hazards, the federal court in Foster v. United States
was required to apply New Mexico law, and it appears to have cor-
rectly interpreted the position of the New Mexico supreme court
at that time. Fortunately, the legal efficacy of that presumption was
later reviewed and rejected in the line of cases discussed below.
It was held in Martinez v. C. R. Davis Contracting Company
that the evidence supported the finding that defendant-contractor,
by permitting a water-filled sewer excavation to go unguarded ex-
cept for one watchman, and barricades generally around the area,
but not around individual excavations, was negligent in failing to
exercise due care for the safety of a fourteen-year-old boy who
drowned while swimming in the excavation.23 The excavation was
in a densely-populated area where children were known to have
been playing. The opinion distinguished the Mellas case on the facts,
saying it was affirmatively established in that case that the defen-
dant was free of negligence in maintaining the pond in which the
nine-year-old boy drowned.24 More importantly, the fourteen-year-
old boy was held not to be contributorily negligent as a matter of
law, and the court pointedly stated that insofar as the dicta in the
Mellas case stated a rule of due care of a minor different from the
holding in this case, such rule was not controlling.25 When neces-
sary to determine whether a child of a certain age was negligent,
the court said it could see no reason for a different rule where lakes
or ponds were involved than where other known dangerous instru-
mentalities caused the injury. It concluded that the question of a
minor's negligence was an issue of fact and the defendant had the
burden of establishing affirmatively the defense of contributory
22. Mellas v. Lowdermilk, supra note 8, at 365, 271 P.2d at 401.
23. Martinez v. C.R. Davis, supra note 12.
24. Id. at 476, 389 P.2d at 598.
25. Id. at 477, 389 P.2d at 599.
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negligence. The court gave this test by which to measure the con-
duct of a child:
. . . whether the child exercised that degree of care ordinarily ex-
ercised by children of like age, capacity, discretion, knowledge and
experience under the same or similar circumstances for his own pro-
tection. 26
The issue of attractive nuisance was not raised by the plaintiffs
in this case. They sought recovery based on negligence. A strong
dissent made note of this point. However, the main issue decided
was whether or not the child had the capacity to comprehend and
avoid a dangerous condition. Only if the child had such appreciation
of danger would he have been capable of contributory negligence.
This is also an essential question in an attractive nuisance case, for
if a child has such appreciation, the attractive nuisance doctrine
cannot be applied as a basis of liability. 2T If the child does not have
such an appreciation of danger, the defense of contributory negli-
gence cannot be used to bar recovery. In any case, there is little
difference in the law of attractive nuisance and the general law
of negligence, except in the recognition of the habits and charac-
teristics of very young children.28
Two later attractive nuisance cases, decided in 1965, further
weakened the authority of the Mellas case.
The first case applied § 339, Restatement of the Law of Torts,
in affirming recovery for injuries sustained by a ten-year-old boy
when he fell into an open ditch excavation while playing and jump-
ing on defendant's school grounds.29 The Mellas decision was held
not to stand for the proposition that certain conditions or instru-
mentalities do or do not constitute an attractive nuisance. The test
of foreseeability of harm to a child under the particular circum-
stances was held to be the crucial consideration in the Mellas case.
In other words, was the danger one the landowner could reasonably
expect the child to fully understand and avoid? The court held
in the instant case that once it is established a defendant knew
children were trespassing to play it becomes a question of fact for
the jury to determine whether the defendant exercised that degree
of care for the protection of the children which the circumstances
required.3 0 The Martinez v. C. R. Davis Construction Company
26. Id.; Saul v. Roman Catholic Church, supra note 12, at 164, 402 P.2d at 50-51.
27. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 339, comment m at 204 (1965).
28. Klaus v. Eden, supra note 13.
29. Saul v. Roman Catholic Church, supra note 12.
30. Id. at 163, 402 P.2d at 50.
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rule for measuring the conduct of a minor in determining contributory
negligence was once again approved.
There was contradictory evidence in this case as to whether the
child understood the condition and realized the risk. In the Mellas
case, there was no evidence to show the child did not have the capac-
ity to understand the condition and realize the risk of drowning.
This decision did not specifically reject the legal presumption raised
in the Mellas case, and it is possible to interpret this decision as
implying that such a legal presumption might still be raised in the
absence of such contradictory evidence.3 1
• . . if reasonable minds can differ as to whether a child because
of his youth discovered the condition or realized the risk involved
• . . , then it becomes an issue of fact for the jury under proper
instructions. 3
2
A dissent, by Chief Justice Carmody and Justice Noble, who also
dissented from the Martinez v. C. R. Davis Construction Company
decision,33 argued that the excavation embodied no danger not
readily apparent to everyone, even young children. They felt the
effect of this decision was to make a landowner an insurer of the
safety of children. They once again argued that the attractive
nuisance doctrine should not be extended to cover cases of patent
visible and alluring dangers other than those arising from mechan-
ical devices.3 4
The second case was an action to recover damages for injuries
sustained by a seven-year-old boy when he fell from a stack of cul-
vert pipes while playing.3 5 On appeal from the granting of summary
judgment for defendants, the court held the trial court had erred
in concluding, as a matter of law, that the culvert pipes had not
constituted an attractive nuisance. It said:
• . . this court has never sanctioned attempts to place cases involving
the doctrine of attractive nuisance in a rigid category on the basis of
the type of condition involved. Whether the maintenance of a specif-
ic condition can give rise to liability for harm to trespassing children
must necessarily turn on the facts of the particular case.30
Chief Justice Carmody and Justice Noble dissented once again,
expressing their concern because it appeared the summary judgment
31. Id.
32. Id. at 164, 402 P.2d at 50-51.
33. Supra note 12 at 480-84, 389 P.2d 601-03.
34. Saul v. Roman Catholic Church, supra note 12, at 165, 402 P.2d at 51.
35. Martinez v. Louis Lyster, General Contractor, Inc., supra note 12.
36. Id. at 642, 409 P.2d at 495.
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rule was no longer being applied to cases involving trespassing
children.37 While admitting that it is not for the best to adopt rigid
categories which may or may not fall within the so-called attractive
nuisance doctrine, they expressed concern with the instant case be-
cause they felt it was obvious that the defendants did not know, or
have any reason to know, that the culvert pipes involved an un-
reasonable risk of death or serious bodily harm to children.38 This
issue, they felt, should have been decided as a matter of law. The
dissent concluded by warning that if the rule, developed in Martinez
v. C. R. Davis Construction Company, Saul v. Roman Catholic
Church and the instant case, were followed to its logical conclusion it
seemed that there would be literally no artificial condition which,
depending upon its use, could not somehow be considered highly
dangerous to a trespassing child.3 9
A review of the New Mexico authority makes it difficult to un-
derstand why Foster v. United States, decided in 1959, has been
the last reported case on the liability of the United States for drown-
ing of infants in irrigation ditches. Elmer Nitzchke, an attorney
in the office of the Field Solicitor, Bureau of Reclamation in Albu-
querque, disclosed that not one administrative claim under the
Federal Tort Claims Act has since been filed by parents of drowned
children. Under New Mexico law, it appears that a well-pleaded
case would at least have to be sent to a jury.40 One of the main
advantages of the attractive nuisance doctrine is in getting an infant
trespasser case beyond summary judgment or a directed verdict. As
was pointed out earlier, even in most jurisdictions where § 339,
Restatement of the Law of Torts, has been adopted as law, there
are certain classes of dangers that have been recognized, such as
fire and water, which under ordinary conditions may reasonably be
expected to be fully understood and appreciated by any child of an
age to be allowed at large. In the absence of a special risk or hidden
danger, the child will probably not discover or appreciate, § 339
ordinarily has no application to such conditions.4 In those jurisdic-
tions, it is still difficult to avoid summary judgment or a directed
verdict in infant trespasser drowning cases. This is the important
distinction for New Mexico practitioners, since now under New
Mexico law, plaintiff does not have the burden of overcoming the pre-
sumption about a child's ability to comprehend the danger of drown-
ing. The defendant has the burden of establishing affirmatively that
37. Id. Probably a reference to the summary judgment rule, N.M.R. Civ. P. 56.
38. Id. at 643, 409 P.2d at 495-96.
39. Id. at 644, 409 P.2d at 496.
40. Saul v. Roman Catholic Church, supra note 12, at 164, 402 P.2d at 50-51.
41. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 339, comment j at 203 (1965).
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the child did have the capacity to comprehend and avoid the danger
if he wants to raise the defense of contributory negligence and avoid
application of the attractive nuisance doctrine. 2 The plaintiff must
only be sure his pleadings can meet the tests of § 339, Restatement
of the Law of Torts.
To determine the probability of success of a wrongful death
action43 against the United States, § 339 will be applied to the
potential facts of such a drowning in the Middle Rio Grande
Project area, while comparing it to New Mexico case law (taking
the sub-sections of § 339 in order) :
A possessor of land is subject to liability for physical harm to children
trespassing thereon caused by an artificial condition upon the land
if . . .44
The basis of this rule is the ordinary negligence basis of a duty
to exercise reasonable care to avoid inflicting foreseeable harm on
another. The possessor has a duty to use reasonable care as to condi-
tions against which a child may not be expected to protect himself.45
A child going onto, or into, a ditch owned by the Middle Rio Grande
Conservancy District and operated by the Bureau of Reclamation is
probably a trespasser, but even if he is not, application of § 339 is
not limited to trespassers. The same duty is owed by a possessor to
a child licensee or invitee. When applying § 339, the status of the
child on the land makes no particular difference. 6 One of the
changes made in the introductory clause of § 339 in the second
edition to the Restatement to the Law of Torts was to drop the
word "young" which preceded "child". This recognizes that the
scope of its application is not limited only to young children. In
New Mexico, recovery has even been allowed for the drowning of a
fourteen-year-old boy. 7 Thus, recovery for the drowning of an in-
fant, aged one to seven, would seem to present no problem.
As in all negligence cases, the dangerous condition must have
been the proximate cause of the physical harm. Finally, the introduc-
tory clause requires that the condition causing the injury be an
artificial one. All of the irrigation ditches of the Middle Rio Grande
Project are artificial.
42. Martinez v. C. R. Davis, supra note 12, at 477, 389 P.2d at 599.
43. N.M. Stat. Ann. § 22-20-1 (1953).
44. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 339, at 197 (1965).
45. Klaus v. Eden, s.upra note 13, at 375, 374 P.2d at 131. Restatement (Second)
of Torts § 339, comment b at 198 (1965).
46. Prosser, supra note 9, at 442-443.
47. Martinez v. C. R. Davis Co., supra note 12. This was not an attractive nui-
sance case; however, the principles of negligence law applied by the court were the
same as would have been applied in an attractive nuisance case.
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(a) The place where the condition exists is one upon which the
possessor knows or has reason to know that children are likely to
trespass, and .... 48
Most decisions are agreed that unless a landowner knows of the
attractive condition of his land, or of past trespasses by children,
or is constructively chargeable with such knowledge because of the
prolonged frequency of past trespasses, there is no liability. 49 In
New Mexico, it is not required that a child actually be attracted to
the premises by the artificial condition itself.5° It is sufficient if the
possessor knows or should know that children are likely to trespass
upon a part of the land upon which there is a condition likely to be
dangerous to them because of their immaturity. 1
The Bureau of Reclamation can certainly be charged with actual
knowledge of the propensity of children and adults to enter onto
their ditch rights-of-way and into their ditches. In fact, they have
encouraged such intrusions by entering into an agreement with the
New Mexico Department of Game and Fish to stock the ditches
with fish.52 They have been on actual notice of this propensity for
many years through numerous news articles, information from their
own ditch riders, the Foster v. United States litigation, and now
the Bureau of Reclamation has taken official cognizance of the
drownings by including detailed statistics on the drownings in its
unpublished Middle Rio Grande Project Water Safety Study.53
(b) The condition is one of which the possessor knows or has reason
to know and which he realizes or should realize will involve an un-
reasonable risk of death or serious bodily harm to such children,
and. .. .. 54
A possessor would be liable only if he knows or has reason to
know that a particular condition exists which is likely to be dan-
gerous to trespassing children. Such knowledge would raise a duty
to exercise reasonable care to keep that part of the land upon which
he should recognize the likelihood of children trespassing free from
those conditions which, though observable by adults, are not likely to
be observed and appreciated by children.55 Again, we are faced with
the problem of determining what risks are obvious to children and
48. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 339(a) (1965).
49. Prosser, supra note 9, at 451.
50. McFall v. Shelley, supra note 11, at 392, 374 P.2d at 143.
51. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 339, comment e at 200 (1965).
52. Annual Report of the Board of Commissioners of the Middle Rio Grande Con-
servancy District 15 (August 31, 1968).
53. Supra note 1. Prosser, supra note 6, at 451.
54. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 339, sub-section (b) at 197 (1965).
55. Id., comment i at 202.
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should be fully appreciated by them. There could be no recovery if a
child, who fully perceived the risks of drowning, went ahead and
recklessly exposed himself to a danger of drowning. The New Mex-
ico case law on this point has been sufficiently discussed previously in
this Comment. However, it is important to add, even in states which
still recognize a legal presumption that water hazards are within the
capacity of young children to comprehend and avoid, there is still a
general rule that if a possessor knows that children too young to ap-
preciate such dangers are likely to trespass on his land, he may still be
subject to liability under § 339.16 It is difficult to determine what con-
stitutes an unreasonable danger to a child. New Mexico courts have
held that three stacked 42-inch culvert pipes could be an unreasonable
danger to a playing seven-year-old child who fell from the pipes, 7 or
that a hole in a school yard approximately two and one-half feet by
three feet and about thirty inches deep was an unreasonable danger
to a child of ten years if left open and uncovered without flares or
barricades."8 Prosser suggests this test:
• . . the unreasonable character of the risk must be determined by
weighing the probability that some harm will occur, and its gravity
if it does occur, against the burden of taking precautions against it.5 9
Judging from what the New Mexico supreme court has held to be
an unreasonable danger, it is logical to assume that irrigation
ditches of the Middle Rio Grande Project would qualify, especially
after the drowning of twenty-two infants between the ages of one
and seven in the last ten years. There are 1,188 miles of these
ditches, many lying alongside heavily populated residential areas.
The water flows at a velocity ranging from 2.0 to 3.50 feet per
second, the ditches are from 4.2 feet to 8.0 feet in depth. The min-
imum base width of these ditches is 6 feet. 60 A child, under the
age of seven, who fell into the current of one of these ditches would
almost inevitably be drowned. The argument is often made, as it
was in the dissent to Martinez v. Louis Lyster General Contractor,
Inc.,61 that the duty of protecting children should fall on the
parents. Within reason, this argument certainly has merit. But chil-
dren are vital members of society and their physical welfare is
56. Id., comment j at 203.
57. Martinez v. Louis Lyster, supra note 12.
58. Saul v. Roman Catholic Church, supra note 10, at 162, 402 P.2d at 49-50.
59. Prosser, supra note 9, at 452.
60. Report of the Chief Engineer, Middle Rio Grande Conservancy District, Vol. 1,
at 98, 99 (1928).
61. Martinez v. Louis Lyster, supra note 12, at 644, 409 P.2d at 496.
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worthy of the law's protection. Accepting these principles as un-
deniably true, one commentator took this position on parental re-
sponsibility:
When he [the landowner] burdens his land with machinery, con-
struction, and developments of many sorts as an incident to his
activities which create conditions beyond the appreciation of children,
instead of throwing further burdens on already heavily pressed
parents, the government has said to the landowner in effect that since
he creates these hazards in the community; since he should know that
children will come in contact with them and will probably be hurt;
since he can fence, guard, or otherwise render them harmless by
relatively inexpensive me~ins; since children can only be developed
through the enjoyment of the freedom the community affords; and
since parents cannot effectively protect them from the dangers at-
tendant upon such activities, the landowner is required to use reason-
able means to protect these young citizens from the risk of injury on
his premises .... 62
An argument has also been made for extension of the attractive
nuisance doctrine based upon twentieth century ideals of humanity
and awareness of social problems occasioned by increasing density
of population, gainful employment of mothers, and an increasingly
greater number of dangerous artificial objects on -populated land. 3
This approach does not seem oppressively burdensome to the land-
owner. No one should advocate such a high level of landowner duty
to trespassing children as to make a public irrigation system finan-
cially inoperable, but, on the other hand, greatly increased risks of
death should require greatly increased expenditures for protection
of young children.
(c) The children because of their youth do not discover the condition
or realize the risk involved in intermeddling with it or in coming
within the area made dangerous by it, and . . .64
The rationale for distinguishing trespassing children from tres-
passing adults rests upon the recognition that children are not
always capable of protecting themselves from danger. If a possessor
knows that children are unlikely to realize the full extent of a
danger, the possessor will still not be liable to a child who in fact
discovers the condition and appreciates the full risk, but recklessly
chooses to encounter it.65 The question in such a case is not what the
62. Green, Lando'wners Responsibility to Children, 27 Tex. L. Rev. 12, 13 (1948).
63. Note, I Ariz. L. Rev. 169, 172, 173 (1959).
64. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 339(c) (1965).
65. Id., comment m at 204.
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possessor may expect of the child, but what the child understands
in fact.66
The wording, "because of their youth," is liable to cause some
difficulty. 7 At what age should § 339 cease to apply to child tres-
passers? Prior to the enunciation of the rule on due care required of
a minor in Barker v. City of Santa Fe, the New Mexico supreme
court found that a child of ten years did not appreciate the danger
of stepping onto apparently solid-looking sludge floating on the top
of a fenced sewage tank in which she drowned.6" Another child of
eight years was held not to appreciate the danger of a propped-up
burned out semi-trailer which fell on him.6" Contra, a child of nine
years was held to have been contributorily negligent for swimming
in an artificial pond which was fenced and around which "no swim-
ming" and "no trespassing" signs were posted.70 Since the above
mentioned rule was adopted, children of seven, ten, and fourteen
years have been held not to have appreciated the dangers of a
shallow unprotected ditch excavation, stacked culvert pipes, and an
improperly guarded sewage excavation filled with water. 71 New
Mexico appears committed to allowing the jury to decide the ques-
tion posed in sub-section (c) according to the facts of the particular
case. If this conclusion is correct, it would be very difficult for the
Bureau of Reclamation to persuade a jury that the average child
under seven years of age is capable of fully realizing the risk of
drowning. A risk of drowning would probably never occur to the
average infant of that age, especially if he were absorbed in the
pursuit of fun.
(d) the utility to the possessor of maintaining the condition and the
burden of eliminating the danger are slight as compared with the risk
involved, and .... 72
The comparison of the recognizable risk to children, with the
utility to the possessor of maintaining the condition is important in
determining whether a condition involves an unreasonable risk to
children. The risk is not unreasonable unless it involves a grave
risk which could be obviated without any serious interference with
66. Prosser, supra note 9, at 461. The reader should refer back to the discussion
of the Martinez v. C.R. Davis Construction Company case for the rule by which con-
duct of a minor is measured in New Mexico. Supra note 28.
67. Comment, 3 Natural Resources J. 193, 200 (1963).
68. Barker v. City of Santa Fe, supra note 13.
69. Selby v. Tolbert, supra note 13.
70. Mellas v. Lowdermilk, supra note 13.
71. Cases cited supra note 12.
72. Restatement (Second) of Torts§339(d) (1965).
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the possessor's legitimate use of his land.73 The rationale behind
this rule is the public's interest in possessors' free use of their land.
However, in recognition of the perhaps greater public interest in
preventing the waste of young human lives, the observations of one
writer have obvious merit:
To require the removal of a great danger only in those cases in which
such removal can be accomplished with "slight expense and little in-
convenience" would seem somewhat extreme, for great dangers may
render necessary great care, involving more than slight expense and
little inconvenience. 74
The same author suggests the following tests for determining the
utility to the possessor of maintaining the condition: first, the
economic usefulness of the dangerous article; second, the cost of
removal of the danger; third, the physical difficulties to be encoun-
tered in removing the danger; and fourth, the degree of interference
of such removal with defendant's business. 75 In a situation where the
public has a clear and definite interest in the maintenance of a condi-
tion, the utility of what a defendant is doing should not be divorced
from the utility of the way it is done.7 6 For example, although few
people would question the social utility of maintaining a public sys-
tem of irrigation ditches, there must be ways to continue operation
of such a system while also minimizing the danger to infants of
drowning.
This sub-section has been referred to in most of New Mexico's
attractive nuisance cases, but in only one of those is there any dis-
cussion of it.7 7 That discussion speaks of the usefulness of natural
and artificial bodies of water to New Mexico's mining industry, to
livestock men, to farmers, and to fruit growers. It notes that such
bodies of water are practically impossible to render harmless, are
indispensable for the maintenance of life and property, and then
argues against extension of the attractive nuisance doctrine to cover
such water hazards. Later cases rejected this inflexible approach of
classifying certain conditions as attractive nuisances. 7 8
The economic and social utility provided by bodies of water is
not to be denied, but the court gave short shrift in its opinion to the
73. Id., comment n at 205.
74. Bauer, The Degree of Danger and the Degree of Difficulty of Removal of the
Danger in "Attractive Nuisance" Cases, 18 Minn. L. Rev. 523, 538 (1934).
75. Id. at 540.
76. Prosser, supra note 9, at 464.
77. Mellas v. Lowdermilk, supra note 8, at 369, 271 P.2d at 403.
78. Supra note 12.
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public interest of protecting the lives of infants. It would indeed be
difficult to render all water hazards harmless to older children, but
at least a reasonable effort should be made to render irrigation
ditches in highly populated areas harmless to infants. Fencing would
protect the younger children. Covering the ditches would probably
protect all children. If fences were just placed between populated
areas and ditches, leaving one side of the ditch open for service
vehicles, there would be little interference with the operation of the
irrigation system. Covering would not only act as a protective fea-
ture, it would also increase the efficiency of the system by reducing
water loss due to evaporation. An interview with the Area Engineer
of the Bureau of Reclamation also disclosed that velocities of water
could be regulated to prevent silt build-up in the ditches thereby
eliminating any necessity for cleaning out of the ditches at periodic
intervals.
Increased efficiency could well be attractive to taxpayers when
they consider the estimated value per acre-foot of water in the Rio
Grande basin for agricultural uses as compared with recreational
and industrial uses. 79
Agricultural $44 to $51
Recreation $212 to $307
Industry $3,040 to $3,989
A lopsided concern over the freedom of a possessor to use his
land as he sees fit seems to be prevalent throughout much of the
case commentary in this area. The freedom of land use of a home-
owner, whose backyard borders a large irrigation ditch is also im-
portant. The purchase of a home should entitle a person to a rea-
sonably safe and secure environment for the rearing of a family
without the nagging worry that a toddler will escape supervision
for a few minutes and be swept away in the muddy current.
During an interview, Mr. Rowland Fife, Area Engineer, Bureau
of Reclamation, estimated that the cost of fencing both sides of all
the ditches or of covering all of the ditches in the Middle Rio
Grande Project could run as high as $15,000,000.00. That assumes,
of course, that fencing of all ditches is necessary to provide any
protection. The Bureau of Reclamation's own Water Safety Study
presents for consideration a plan for selective fencing or covering
on a priority basis with Class A hazard areas receiving first pri-
ority.8 o A table in this study summarizes water hazard classifications
in the Middle Rio Grande Project showing that eight per cent, or
79. Wollman, The Value of Water in Alternative Uses at xvii (1962).
80. Supra note 1.
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101 miles of the total 1,188 miles of ditches in the system, lie in
class A hazard areas. The study defines the class A hazard classifica-
tion as: "Those hazardous locations and structure sites readily
accessible to the public from an adjacent or nearby city or school
and subject to numerous and frequent visits from the public."
The Annual Report of the Board of Commissioners of the
Middle Rio Grande Conservancy District,81 for the fiscal year ended
August 31, 1968, shows total receipts of $2,207,310.02. The same
report also reflects a surplus balance of $1,446,540.46. This latter
figure apparently represents several years accumulatipn of excess
receipts over disbursements. That portion of the report is repro-
duced below:
Balance August 31, 1967
Add-Excess Receipts over Disbursements
Balance August 31, 1968
Represented by the Following:
Operation and
M aintenance Fund ........... $195,854.55
Investments-O & M ........ $602,250.00
Construction Fund ........... $ 58,669.93
Investments-
Construction ............... $235,899.90
Undistributed Collections
Special Fund
Rehabilitation .............. $ 68,124.29
Investments ................ $226,063.86
$1,180,534.75
266,005.71
$1,446,540.46
$ 798,104.55
294,569.83
59,677.93
$ 294,188.15
$1,446,540.46
In view of the highly solvent financial condition of the District, any
protestations to a jury that a selective fencing program would be
financially burdensome should fall on unsympathetic ears. Based on
the $15,000,000.00 cost estimate cited earlier, if only the areas of
greatest hazard in the district, or according to the Water Safety
Study, eight percent of the ditches were fenced or covered first, the
cost of such a project, based on eight percent of $15,000,000.00,
should be about $1,200,000.00. The implications of this reasoning
should be clear. The necessary funds could be paid to the Bureau
81. Annual Report of the Board of Commissioners of the Middle Rio Grande
Conservancy District 21 (August 31, 1968).
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of Reclamation out of the surplus accounts by the Middle Rio
Grande Conservancy District, and, in accord with their operation
and maintenance contract, the Bureau of Reclamation could carry
out a program of selective fencing or covering based on the findings
of its Water Safety Study.
Legally, such an investment would appear to be prudent for both
agencies. A reasonable man could be expected to enclose the areas
where there is the highest risk of infant drownings first. A good
faith effort to do what is financially possible in the way of enclosure
would strengthen their position in the eyes of a court. They would
have done all a reasonable man could have been expected to do
under the circumstances to alleviate the danger to infants.
(e) the possessor fails to exercise reasonable care to eliminate the
danger or otherwise to protect the children.82
This sub-section was added to § 339 in the second edition of the
Restatement of the Law of Torts. It expressly recognizes the pre-
viously implicit assumption that liability under this section is lia-
bility for negligence. A possessor of land is only liable to the tres-
passing child if he fails to conform to the conduct of a reasonable
man under like circumstances. If he exercises all reasonable care
to make a condition safe, or to protect the children, and still does
not succeed, there is no liability. 3 The circumstances, the location
of the condition, and the age of the child are important in determin-
ing what is reasonable. The question is normally for a jury, unless
there is a clear disproportion between the burden and the danger.14
The recognition that attractive nuisance liability is essentially li-
ability for negligence is well established in New Mexico. 5
Neither the Bureau of Reclamation, nor the Middle Rio Grande
Conservancy District has taken affirmative action to protect infants
from exposure to drowning in their ditches. One reason given for
their inaction is that to accept any responsibility, for even partial
enclosure of the ditches, would leave them liable to a flood of tort
litigation. It is unconscionable to allow a complete abdication of
responsibility on such grounds. The limitation of choices to either
complete enclosure of every foot of every ditch or complete refusal
to offer any safeguards, does not demonstrate a reasonable basis on
which to formulate sound social policy. It should not be condoned.
The courts have an opportunity in this instance to formulate a
82. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 339(e) (1965).
83. Id., comment e at 206.
84. Prosser, supra note 9, at 468.
85. Selby v. Tolbert, supra note 13.
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flexible approach to this problem. They could require the Bureau of
Reclamation to assume the duty of taking only reasonable precau-
tions. The Bureau should not be penalized for good faith attempts
to protect infants in high population areas where the per capita ex-
posure to drowning is greatest. 6 There should be no duty of en-
closure in essentially rural areas where only intermittent exposure
to drowning can be expected. Neither should the Bureau be held
liable for drownings which occur because of conditions they are in
good faith unable to prevent or control.
One tragic question lurks behind this entire discussion. How many
infants must drown before a court will decide the risk is unreason-
able and will require the danger to be alleviated? More specifically,
how many young lives must be wasted before a court feels the
expenditure of several million dollars on fencing or covering of
ditches is justifiable ? If the courts hold that such a large expendi-
ture cannot be justified in this type of situation, then they will be
ignoring a great social responsibility.
Twenty-two young lives have already been wasted. The sacrifices
these young victims and their parents have made certainly justify at
least a substantial preventive effort from the Bureau of Reclamation
and the Middle Rio Grande Conservancy District. It appears, now,
that a reasonable effort could be forced by the use of litigation.
JOHN M. EAVES
86. Of a total twenty-one children who drowned, thirteen, or sixty-one percent,
drowned in the heavily populated Albuquerque Division. Drownings in the summer of
1969 are not included above. Supra note 1.
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